QUESTION 1 (60 PTS)

MAX

PTS

V: Our contract is binding because of the presence of consideration on both sides. I promised to videotape D’s wedding and she promised to arrange for me to do so. I would suffer the legal detriment of having to videotape the wedding. She suffered the legal detriment of having to be married on a particular day (December 7). Each of us would be receiving a benefit from the detriment undertaken by the other. This exchange fulfilled the definition of consideration.

6

V: D’s promise (that I could videotape her wedding on December 7) was binding based on section 90 RS2 and she breached by not providing me with the promised opportunity to videotape her wedding on that day. She could foresee that I would detrimentally rely on her promise and I did - by reserving the date and getting my equipment ready - and justice requires that her promise to me be enforced. She knew the harm to me if I didn’t have a videotape that I could use in my new business.

6

V: contract is enforceable because it is supported by “moral consideration”; as in section 86 RS2d, our agreement is enforceable  because it was made in response to a benefit previously received (her helping my mother) and injustice can be avoided only by making our promises binding

6

V: If binding by consideration, D owes me my expectation remedy - the value to me of having a videotape of her wedding as an asset of my business

5

V: If binding under RS 90 or RS 86, D owes me the labor and material costs of preparing to videotape her wedding

5

D: contract is not enforceable because it simply involved the exchange of gift promises. V wanted to make a gift to me of a videotape of my wedding. I saw the value to V of having that video as a sample and I wanted her to have such a value. Our intentions were donative and not enforceable as contract.

6

D: I did not and could not expect that marriage on a particular day would create the reliance that V describes. I could only have expected that reliance had I known that she could not videotape the wedding one week later than originally set and I had no reason to know  that. Furthermore justice does not require that my promise be held to be binding. It won’t be difficult for V to find someone else who would like their wedding videotaped for free.

6

D: Section 86 would only apply here if I were suing V for breach - which I am not. Section 86 is designed to make enforceable a promise by the benefitted person. She was the benefitted person, not me and I am not seeking to enforce her promise to me to videotape my wedding. Also, since she was not legally responsible for her mother, section 86 would not even enable me to enforce the promise V made to me since she had not benefitted from the help I gave her mother.

6

D: Even if consideration is present, there is no basis for granting an expectation remedy to V - there is no basis for valuing her claimed loss.

5

D: Even if made binding by RS 90 or RS 86, there is no value which can be identified that justice would require me to pay to V - she has expended no money and has made no argument that there was another wedding she could have videotaped on December 7.

5

Miscellaneous:

4

TOTAL:

60

QUESTION 2 (60 PTS)

MAX

PTS

DD (her affirmative damage argument): Paul breached by not delivering to me the furniture that I had selected under our agreement. This was a transaction in goods subject to Article 2 of the UCC. Under 2-712 I could cover. On these facts that would cost me $5000. I have already “paid” for the goods by capping 2 of his teeth, so the contract price has been paid. Under 2-712 P should be ordered to pay me $5000. If I do not cover, under 2-713 Paul would owe me the difference between the market price and the contract price. Since I have already  paid the contract price, I should receive $5000. This interpretation of the UCC provisions is consistent with UCC 1-305 which states that the remedies of the UCC must be “liberally administered to the end that the aggrieved party may be put in as good a position as if the other party had fully performed.”

10

PP (his response to her affirmative damage argument): even if I breached by not delivering your selected furniture to you, you are wrong about what damages you are entitled to. You were the buyer of furniture and you have paid for the furniture by capping 2 of my teeth. Under 2-711 you are entitled to recover “so much of the price as has been paid.” You can recover the caps by taking them out of my mouth. If you cover, you are entitled to the difference between the cover price and the contract price. The contract price was $2500 (2 x $1250). Under 2-712 you are entitled to the difference between your cover price ($5000?) and the contract price ($2500) or under 2-713, to the difference between the market price ($5000) and the contract price ($2500). 

10

PP (his affirmative damage argument): you breached your promise to provide me with caps that would look just like my original teeth. I am entitled to my expectation damages which should be measured by the difference in value between perfect teeth and what you put in my mouth. This should be measured by what it would cost to take these caps out and put in caps that conform to your promise. You say that that means both the cost of putting in new caps ($2500) plus the cost of root canal work (2 x $1000 = $2000) for a total of $4500. Only by compensating me this way would I be put in the position that I would have been in had you performed in accordance with your promise. I am also entitled to pain and suffering associated with replacing the caps and with the root canal procedure.

10

DD (her response to his affirmative damage argument): your proposed remedy is certainly an example of economic waste which the court should not order. The whole process of replacing the caps will add nothing to the value of your mouth, certainly the value would be far less than the $4500 you are claiming. In this circumstance the courts should not use your cost of completion formula, they should use a diminished value formula. You are entitled only to the difference between your mouth with caps that look like your original teeth and your mouth with the caps that you now have.

10

DD (her restitution argument): even if I breached the contract, I am entitled to the value of the benefit which I provided to you under circumstances in which it is clearly not a gift. That value should be the reasonable cost of providing you with the caps now in your mouth. Since I charge standard prices, that should be $2500. Even if I breached, it is unjust that you retain the value of my services and the caps without paying for them and a restitution obligation is therefore created.

8

PP (resisting restitution argument): since I am going to have to replace the caps, I don’t have any valuable asset that you provided to me and you are, therefore, not entitled to restitution.

8

Miscellaneous:

4

TOTAL:

60